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MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY: AN ABANDONMENT OF
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
HISTORICALLY, a municipal corporation was subject .in all respects to
the same tort liability as any private corporation.' But in i842, in
Bailey v. New York,2 the court indicated that the defendant city would
not have been liable had it been performing a "governmental" rather
than a "proprietary" function, thus establishing a dichotomy which has
persisted for over one hundred years8 and which, although criticized as
'People v. Albany, ii Wend. 539, (N.Y. 1834); Martin v. Brooklyn, x Hill 545
(N.Y. 844.). See also RHYNE, MUNICIPAL LAW §§ 30, 31 (1957). Contra, Mower
v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 247 (18 12) ; Riddle v. Proprietors of the Locks and Canals on
Merrimack River, 7 Mass.. 169 (181o).
When a municipality is acting in a governmental or public capacity, or fulfilling
the state's functions, it generally enjoys the same immunity as the states. However,
this immunity does not apply to its liability for failure to perform certain statutory or
common law duties, as keeping streets and'highways committed to its care in a reason-
ably safe condition. Tooke, The Extension of Municipal Liability in Tort, x9 VA. L.
REV. 97, 100 (1932).
23 Hill 531 (N.Y. 1842).
"As to the dual character of the municipal corporation, see New York v. United
States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946); Krantz v. City of Hutchinson, x65 Kan. 449, x96 P.2d
227 (1948); Wodld v. City of Portland, 166 Ore. 455, i2 P.2d 469 (1941); Memphis
Power and Light Co. v. City of Memphis, 172 Tenn. 346, 112 S.W.2d 817 (1937))
Hagerman v. City of Seattle, x89 Wash. 694, 66 P.zd xxS (1937)3 Loeb v. City of
Jacksonville, xox Fla. 429, 134 So. 205 (1931).
The municipality, acting as a public agency, is a subdivision of the state, endowed
with governmental powers and charged with governmental functions and responsibilities.
City of High Point v. Duke Power Co., xzo F.±d 866 (4th Cir. 1941); Department
of Treasury v. City of Evansville, 223 Ind. 435, 6o N.E.2d 957 (1945). Acting as
a corporate body, it is capable of the same acts as a private corporation. City of Ben-
wood v. Interstate Bridge Co., 3o F. Supp. 952 (D.C. W. Va. 1940 ) ; Board of Council-
men of City of Frankfort v. White, 224 Ky. 570, 6 S.W.2d 699 (1928).
The courts have attempted to distinguish between governmental and corporate func-
tions, holding that in so far as a municipality attempts to represent the state in its
governmental or public capacity, it is immune from tort liability, and when acting in
its corporate or proprietary capacity it may be liable in tort. See generally, i 8 Mc-
QUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.01 ( 3 d ed. x95o); Doddridge, Distinction
Between Governmental and Proprietary Functions of Municipal Corporations, 23 MICH.
L. REv. 325 (19±5); Barnett, The Foundations of the Distinction Between Public and
Pricate Functions in Respect to the Common Law Tort Liability of Municipal Corpo-
rations, 16 ORE. L. REV. '250 (1937). For a recent case applying the classification
test, see City and County of Dehver v. Austria, 318 P.±d xox (Colo. 1957) where
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illogical, 4 has been accepted with occasional minor refinement in many
the erection of a fence across the steps of a municipal building while removing Christmas
decorations was said to be proprietary.
While the bifurcation of the municipal entity springs from the Bailey case, the
principle of the immunity of the sovereign adhering to a lesser unit of the governmental
structure finds its immediate judicial origin in Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 T.R. 667,
oo Eng. Rep. 359 (1788), an early Englih case decided on rather questionable
grounds. In that case an unincorporated county was held immune from responsibility for
an injury arising out of a defective bridge because it had no corporate funds or the
means of obtaining them, and it seemed impracticable to permit judgment to be satisfied
out of the assets of a few individuals.
The idea of governmental immunity in this country appears to have been worked
out first in New England, where the Massachusetts court, in Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass.
247 (Sire), rendered judgment for the defendant county on the ground that it was a
quasi-corporation created by the legislature for purposes of public policy, and that as
an agent of the state, it was immune. This was done with reliance upon the Russell
case, although practically no reason for immunity can be found to exist in the Mower
case, since the county involved was incorporated, had a corporate fund, and was charged
by statute with the duty of keeping highways in repair. This inadequately reasoned
decision, based upon a case which is contradictory rather than supportive, has been
followed generally in the United States, and the view expressed has, with a few excep-
tions, become the common law. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34- YALE LJ.
1, 41 (1924). •
It is interesting to note that in Maryland the court readily perceived the distinction
between the county in the Russell case and an incorporated Maryland county having
a corporate fund. Anne Arundel County v. Dudkett, 20 Md. 468 (.864).
' The literature abounds in criticism of the classification approach. See generally,
Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. x (1924) ; Seasongood,
Municipal Corporations: Objections to the Governmental or Proprietary Test, 22 VA.
L. REV. 9io (1936) 5 Ropes, Torts' Doctrine of Municipal Immunity-A Myth, 8
MIAMI L.Q. 555 (1954). An extensive note in 17 U. PI'TT..L. REV. 674- (1956) con-
tains an excellent analysis of the law in Pennsylvania and is especially critical of the
governmental-proprietary distinction. See also, Price and Smith, Municipal Tort
Liability: A Continuing Enigma, 6 U. FLA. L. RE.V 330. (953).
The difficulty in attempting to categorize the functions of a municipality as govern-
mental or proprietary is that there is no universally. applicable test or compreheniive
definition available. City of Tampa v. Easton, 145 Fla. 188, 198 SO. 753 (L94o).
Indeed, it has been said that it is an absurdity to attempt to distinguish between govern-
mental or public and corporate or private functions for the purpose of determining tort
liability. For a collection of cases classifying various functions, see Note, 34 HARV. L.
REV. 66 (192o). See also, Barnett, Public Agencies and Private Agencies, x8 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 34 (1924).
Recognizing the difficulty of making any rational classification, at least one court
has rejected the distinction altogether, holding that all functions of municipal corpora-
tions are of a public or governmental nature, the exercise of which does not result in
tort liability. Abernathy v. City of Columbia, 213 S.C. 68, 48 S.E.2d 585 (1948);
Sheriff v. City of Easley, 178 S.C. 504, 183 S.E. 311 (936).
On the other hand, Florida had once adopted the view that the old concepts em-
bodied in the immunity rule were not applicable to modern cities operating under the
commission or city manager forms of government, but that the activities of such cities
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other jurisdictions.5  That this limited liability has its roots in the
doctrine of sovereign immunity seems abundantly certain,0 and while a
few states have not expressly applied the Bailey rationale to questions
of municipal liability,7 the great majority have adopted some mode of
accomplishing the same result.8  These latter tests, like the former,
however, suffer from a common inherent deficiency-the lack of a
were more in the nature of a business than a government, and such functions were
treated as proprietary, in the exercise of which municipalities are liable for the negli-
gence of their officers and agents. Kaufman v. Tallahassee, 84 Fla. 634, 94 So. 697
(1922).
'Cases cited note 3 supra. See also, Miller, Recent Substantive Developments
Affecting Municipal Tort Liability, 2x U. CINN. L. REV. 31 (1952).
'See City of Harlan v. Peaveley, 224 Ky. 338, 6 S.W.2d 270 (1928); Barnett v.
State, 2ao N.Y. 423, xx6 N.E. 99 (192o). This position has been extensively criticized.
See Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. i, 2 (1924), where it is
pointed out that in spite of the fact that the conditions giving rise to absolutism abroad,
aid since abandoned there, have not and do not exist in this country, it has still been
difficult to secure a legislative reconsideration of the propriety and justification of the
immunity rule.
Even historically, this doctrine has little foundation. That this maxim was mis-
understood even by Blackstone and Coke is indicated in the excellent monograph of
EHRLICH, PROCEEDINGS AGAxNST THE CtOWN (192i). It merely meant that the king
was not privileged to do wrong. If his acts were against the law they were wrongs.
The doctrine of acquired or vested rights had been firmly established in medieval law,
and was kept alive by the jurists of the natural law school. The king and his officials
were subject to these rights and the individual was deemed as privileged in the enjoy-
mqnt of his rights against the king as against any other person. The infallible and
non-responsible king was a conception of post-thirteenth century England. and was his-
torically unjustified. Borchrd, supra, at 41. See also, Barry, The King Can Do No
Wrong, ii VA. L. REV. 349 (1925). Cf. Feather v. Regina, 6 Best. & S. 257 (x865).
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is fully discussed in Gardner, Geller, McGrory,
and Shaffer, An Inquiry Into the Principles of Municipal Responsibility in General
Assumpsit and Tort, 8 VAND. L. REV. 753 (1955).
'See note 4 supra.
'Other tests include: (t) Classification of duties and powers as mandatory or per-
misive, imposing liability if the injury results from the exercise of the permissive
powers, and not otherwise. Martinson v. Alpena, 328 Mich. 595, 44 N.W.2d 148
(195o); Storti v. Fayal, .94 Minn. 628, 261 N.W. 463 (1935) 1 Burns v. Jackson, 140
Miss. 656, 1o5 So. 86.x (1925); But cf. Day v. Berlin, 157 F.2d 323 (ist Cir. 1946).
(2) Classification of municipal functions as discretionary or ministerial, imposing
liability only in the latter category. Harris v. District of Columbia, z56 U.S. 65o
(1921); Johnston v. Atlanta, 7z Ga. App. 552, 31 S.E.2d 417 (1944). (3) Classifica-
tion of activity as either nonfeasance or misfeasance, imposing liability for misfeasance
only. Van Zandt v. Bergen County, 79 F.zd 506 (3d Cir. 1935), Adams v. Toledo,
163 Ore. 185, 96 P.2d 1078 (-939). (4) Classification as an act as intra vires or
ultra vires, granting immunity if ultra vires. Palm Beach v. Vlahos, x52 Fla. 159, 15
So.ad 848 (x944); Chicago v. Williams, 182 Ill. i35 , 55 N.E. 123 (1899). Contra,
Whitacre v. Charlotte, 2x6 N.C. 687, 6 S.E.2d 558 (1940). Cf., Cardiff Light and
Water Co. V. Taylor, 73 Colo. 566, 2x6 Pac. 711 (1923).
1958] NOTES
definitive standard of application, which leaves the courts free to achieve
a desired result in a given case by a simple classification technique. -
But quite apart from this technical infirmity, there is the more funda-
mental question of why a municipality should thus be immunized from
tort liability.10 The proprietary-governmental distinction merely states
a result, rather than affords a reason i for if the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, in fact, constitutes an impediment to suit, it would logically
apply equally to all municipal functions."
In order to avoid this impasse, therefore, some courts have de-
veloped a more sophisticated rationalization: that it is better for in-
dividuals to suffer occasional injury in certain areas of governmental
activity than for the public to bear the cost of a major liability and
possible discontinuation of an essential service.U This position, how-
ever, is not attuned to the recent social trend toward apportioning loss,
especially to those who can spread or insure against it.' 3 Moreover, al-
' See note 4 supra. Hazard v. Duff, 287 Ky. 427, 154 S.W.2d 28 ('941); Mont-
gomery v. Quinn, 246 Ala. 154, i9 So.2d 529 (-94.).
"It is frequently said that the reason for exempting a municipality from liability
for injuries inflicted in the performance of its governmental functions is one of public
policy, to protect public funds from being directed from governmental purposes:
Taylor v. Westerfield, 233 Ky. 619, 26 S.W.zd 557 (1930).
Almost without exception the literature denies the soundness of any basis for refusing
liability. See Gardner, Geller, McGrory, and Shaffer, An Inquiry Into the Principles
of Municipal Responsibility in General d4ssumpsit and Tort, 8 VAND. L. REv. 753
(1955); Warp, The Law and Administration of Municipal Tort Liability) 28 VA.
L. REV. 36o (1924); Borchard, Goverunent Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1 (1924);
Lloyd, Municipal Tort Liability in New York, 23 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 278 (1948); Note,
ioo U. PA. L. REV. 92 (195x); Smith, Municipal Tort Liability, 4.8 MicH. L. REV. 41
(x949).
"This conclusion appears inescapable, although not advanced by the proponents of
the immunity doctrine, since it would result in even more obvious inequities than the
classification approach. See generally the law review treatment supra note io.
"This argument was presented in the case of Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 T.R. 667,
oo Eng. Rep. 359 (1788). For an excellent dissenting opinion,- see Fowler v. City
of Cleveland, ioo Ohio St. 158, 126 N.E. 72 (1919). See also, Harn6, Tort Immunity
of Municipal Corporations, 4 ILL. L.Q. 28 (1921), which is epecially critical both
of the interpretations of the Russell case and the reasons assigned in support of-its
purported holding. The plaintiff's unavailing plea in the Russell case has been cited
as an admirable present-day position. Note, '17 U. Prrr. L. REV. 674 (x956).
"A familiar instance of this is the state workmen's compensation acts. N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 97-1-122 (1950).
A general trend toward increased liability may be noticed in the Federal Tort Claims
Act of 1946, 62 STAT. 869, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 134 6(b), 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401-2,
24.11-12, 2671-8o (195±). See Comment, 56 YALE L.J. 534 (947).
For what is perhaps the best summation of the law in each of the forty-eight states
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though some courts have suggested that a doctrine of absolute municipal
liability would tend to cripple certain municipal operations,'4 it is at least
arguable that such a doctrine might rather tend to insure a more circum-
spect performance of duties and an increased selectivity and training of
municipal employees.' 5
Still other courts have suggested that since municipal employees
are not agents of the municipality, the doctrine of respondeat superior
does not apply;' and others urge that the absence of pecuniary profit
or benefit to the municipality should, in any event, relieve it from
liability.' 7 Neither of these reasons, however, is fundamentally sound,
as the fact of agency is not to be determined from the character of the
see Leflar and Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U.L. REV. 2363, 1367-
1407 (1954.;
The problem posed by insurance has several interesting facets. In Bailey v. City of
Knoxville, 223 F. Supp. 3 (D.C. Tenn. 1953) where a statute barred suits arising from
the'operation of an airport, classifying that function as governmental, and the city car-
ried liability insurance, the court held that the immunity was waived. See Notes, 52
MicH. L. REV. 457 (1954); 24 TExN. L. REv. 272 (x956). See also, Taylor v. Knox
County Bd. of Education, 292 Ky. 767, 167 S.W.zd 700 (1942). But cf. Pobland v.
City of Sheboygan, zs Wis. 20, 27 N.W.2d 736 (1947). In Osback v. Lyndhurst
Township, 7 N.J. 372, 81 A.2d 721 (1951), where the municipality was required by
statute to have insurance, it was held that the failure of the municipality to insure
resulted in non-liability on the basis of a resurrection of the common law immunity.
See Note, 23 Miss. L.J. 300 (1952). For a summation of this problem see, Comment,
54 MICH. L..REV. 404 (x956) which concludes, "In general, the carrying of liability
insurance is not a waiver of immunity from suit or from tort liability, This result
is historically.supportable. However, it often results in a finding that an insurer is not
liable on a policy because the insured cannot be sued. This defeats the purpose of the
policy, and to allow the immune entity to recover the premiums is no answer to the
increasing problems of municipal torts. But a trend toward increasing municipal liability
is discernible and ought to be given judicial impetus. By scrapping the protection-of-
public fuids basis of the immunity where insurance makes this basis no longer sound,
or by removing immunity to suits in statutes giving permission to insure, the public
desire for the fair compensation of all injured parties could be given a realistic, eco-
nomical, and just fulfilment." 54 MicH. L. REv. at 412.
"People v. Superior Court, 29 Cal.zd 754, 178 P.zd i (1947); Coolidge v.
Brookline, 114 Mass. 592 (874). See Dodderidge, Distinction Between Governmental
and Proprietary Functions of Municipal Corporations, 23 MicH. L. REV. 325, 336,
337 (19S).
" City of Miami v. Bethel, 65 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1953). See Ropes, Torts' Doctrine
of Municipal Immunity--d Myth, 8 MiAmi L.Q. 555 (1954) which emphasizes the
possibility of better supervision as a result of the imposition of liability.
"Lawton v. Harkins, 34 Okla. 545, 126 Pac. 727 (2912); Burill v. Augusta, 78
Me. zuS, I Ad. 277 (1886)5 Wilcoy v. Chicago, 207 III. 334 (t883). See Note,
34 Hv. L. REV. 66 (29:o).
"' Orlando v. Brockton, 295 Mass. 205, 3 N.E.2d 794 (1936); Hill v. Boston, 122
Mass. 344 (IS77).
service rendered, and tort liability is never properly predicated upon a
benefit derived by the tortfeasor.18
Some of the difficulties posed by this categorization of municipal
functions are illustrated by the situation which has developed in Florida.
There, the courts had long adhered to a governmental-corporate dis-
tinction in assessing municipal tort liability.'9 In recent years, however,
concern over the injustices inherent in such a rule evoked a series of
subterfuges to avoid its application .2  The resulting confusion led the
Supreme Court of Florida, in the recent case of Hargrove v. Town of
Cocoa Beach,21 finally to adopt the rule that "when an individualsuffers
a direct, personal injury proximately caused by the negligence of a
municipal employee while acting within the scope of his employment,
the injured individual is entitled to redress [against the municipality]
for the wrong done."22  Thus, the widow of a prisoner who died of
asphyxiation in the city jail could maintain an action for the wrongful
death of her husband, caused by the negligence of the jailer. The
Florida Court, in taking this step, expressly flouted its own contrary
precedent,23 refusing to be "blindly loyal to the docirine of stare
decisis,'" 24 recognizing that "the law is not static"25 and stating:
The great body of our laws is the product of progressive
thinking which attunes traditional concepts to the needs and de-
mands of changing times. The modern city is in substantial
measure a large business institution. While it enjqys many of
the basic powers of government, it nonetheless is an incorporated
organization.... To continue to endow this type of organiza-
tion with sovereign divinity appears to us to predicate the law
of the Twentieth Century upon an Eighteenth Century anachro-
nism. Judicial consistency loses its virtue when it is degraded by
the vice of injustice 6
"'Martin v. Temperly, [x843] 4 Q.B. 298. See Note, 34. HAIV. L. REV. 66
(1920).
" For an excellent summary of the Florida cases with respect to this situation see
Price and Smith, Municipal Tort Liability: a Continuing Enigma, 6 U. FLA. L. RZy.
330 (1953).2 0 Ibid. 21 96 SO.2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
2 96 So.2d at 133.
"Brownlee v. City of Orlando, 157 Fla. 524, 6 SO.2d 504 (1946); Kennedy
v. City of Daytona Beach, 132 Fla. 675, 182 So. 228 (1938); Janes v. City of Tampa,
52 Fla. 292, 42 So. 729 (907): ..
S 9 6 SO.2d at 233. 25 Ibid.
i" Ibid.
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Any present attempt to evaluate the effect of the Hargove decision
on the existing municipal tort liability concepts in other jurisdictions
would be premature.
Although some jurisdictions have already modified municipal im-
munity by statute,27 there has been a widespread judicial reluctance to
review exemption from tort liability,28 .apparently reflecting an attitude
that it is not properly within the province of the courts to tamper with
such purportedly long-standing common-law limitations.2 Accordingly,
many courts would view the action of the Florida Supreme Court as
inexcusable judicial legislation and would, if faced with the same situa-
tion, tend rather to rely on legislative wisdom, albeit manifested by
inaction rather than by positive affirmation of the immunity rule.
Since, however, the rule of municipal immunity is really of relatively
recent judicial origin and is founded upon principles of dubious valid-
ity, 0 this self-restraint seems less than laudable, especially in light of
27 CAL. VEHICLE CODE §§ 400, 401; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.141 (1948). WIS.
STAT. C. 77 (x929). See Shumacker v. Milwaukee, 209 Wis. 43, 243 N.W. 756
(1932). See also, Fuller and Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, S.4 HARV.
L. REV. 437, 444 (194) ;. MacDonald, The Administration of a Tort Liability Law
in Now York, 9 LAW AND CoNrzMP. PROB. 262 (1942); Borchard, Proposed State
and Local statutes Imposing Public Liability in Tort, 9 LAw AND CONTEMP. PROB.
282 (1942). Occasionally there have been legislative restrictions of the common
law liability for torts arising out of proprietary enterprises. See 2 TEr. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN., art. 1175, sub. 6 (:9:5-38).
On the other hand, there has been direct statutory opposition to liability for
municipal activities classified as governmental. -See Bryan v. City of Chicago, 371 Ill.
64, 2o N.E.2d 37 (1939). See also, Note, 25 So. CALIF. L. REV. 489 (1952) crit-
icizing the court's narrow interpretation of a restrictive statute.
"Warden v. City of Grafton, 99 W. Va. 249, 128 S.E. 375 (x925); Aldrich
v. Youngstown, xo6 Ohio St. 342, 14o N.E. 164 (1922); Fowler v. Cleveland, ,oo
Ohio St. x58, 126 N.E. 72 (i9:9); Jones v. Sioux City, x85 Iowa 1178, 17o N.W.
445 (19'9). See also, Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. I
(1924); Tooke, The Extension of Municipal Liability in Tort, 19 VA. L. REV. 97
(1932).
"Ramirez v. Cheyenne, 34 Wyo. 67, 241 Pac. 710 (1925); Scebillia v. Phila-
delphia, 279 Pa. 549, 120 At. 273 (1924). See also, Smith, Municipal Tort Liability,
48 MICH. L. REV- 41, 47 (1949); Lloyd, Municipal Tort Liability in New York: A
Legislative Challenge, 23 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 278 (1948); Note, 31 B.U.L. REV. 386
(195x) commenting on the reluctance of the Massachusetts courts to change the com-
mon law immunity; Note, 28 TEMP. L.Q. 283 (1954), urging the necessity of a
definitive law by the legislature; Seasongood, Municipal Corporations: Objections to the
Governmental or Proprietary Test, 22 VA. L. REV. 910, 941, 944 (1936), calling
for legislative action, expressing the conclusion that the courts cannot do the job.
"Notes 3 and 6 supra. In the Hargrove case the Court stated: "We can see no
necessity for insisting on legislative action in a matter which the courts themselves
originated." 96 So.2d at 132.
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the realities of modern community life and the possibility of serious
injustice that may be done to the injured individual31 This, it is
submitted, far outweighs the conjectural additional financial burdens on
small communities that might eventuate.3 2
"'Green, Freedom of Litigation-Municipal Liability for Torts, 38 ILL. L. REV.
355, 379 (1943).
" See Warp, Tort Liability Problems of Small Municipalities, 9 LAW AN D Co~NiFP.
PROB. 363, 367 (194±) where it is concluded that: 'It would seem that there is
little cause for fear that an extension of liability to the performance of so-called gov-
ernmental functions would bankrupt the small municipalities as a. group.... It would
seem that the method of meeting the situation i% not in granting immunity to small
municipalities, but in devising some form of state or cooperative insurance, perhaps
made compulsory by statute."
